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Abstract 
Comprehensible explanations of probabilistic 
reasoning are a prerequisite for wider acceptance 
of Bayesian methods in expert systems and 
decision support systems. A study of human 
reasoning under uncertainty suggests two different 
strategies for explaining probabilistic reasoning 
specially attuned to human thinking: The first, 
qualitative belief propagation, traces the 
qualitative effect of evidence through a belief 
network from one variable to the next. This 
propagation algorithm is an alternative to the 
graph reduction algorithms of Wellman (1988) for 
inference in qualitative probabilistic networks. It is 
based on a qualitative analysis of intercausal 
reasoning, which is a generalization of Pearl's 
"explaining away", and an alternative to Wellman's 
definition of qualitative synergy. The other, 
Scenario-based reasoning, involves the generation 
of alternative causal "stories" accounting for the 
evidence. Comparing a few of the most probable 
scenarios provides an approximate way to explain 
the results of probabilistic reasoning. Both 
schemes employ causal as well as probabilistic 
knowledge. Probabilities may be presented as 
phrases and/or numbers. Users can control the 
style, abstraction and completeness of 
explanations. 
1 Introduction 
The developers of expert systems and decision 
support systems have long been aware of the 
importance of facilities to explain the computer­
based reasoning to users as a prerequisite to their 
more widespread acceptance (e.g. Teach & 
Shortliffe, 1981). Unless users can come to 
* This work was supported by the National Science 
Foundation under grant IRI-8807061 to Carnegie Mellon 
and by the Rockwell International Science Center. 
understand the assumptions and reasoning of 
such systems, it is impossible to develop the kind 
of human-machine collaboration that is the basis 
for successful use of such systems. For 
explanations to be effective, their form and content 
must be carefully matched to the users' 
competence, knowledge, and styles of reasoning. 
The approach that underlies the classic "expert 
systems" paradigm is to employ computer 
representations and inference mechanisms 
intended to emulate human reasoning. To the 
extent that this emulation is successful, the 
computer-based reasoning ought to seem familiar 
to people and so relatively easy to explain. While 
there is ample evidence that normatively appealing 
probabilistic and decision theoretic schemes are 
poor models of human reasoning under 
uncertainty (e.g. Kahneman et a/. 1982), there is 
surprisingly little experimental evidence that the 
rule-based alternatives, such as certainty factors 
or fuzzy logic, are any better as descriptive 
models. And even if successful descriptively, the 
emulative approach would merely reproduce the 
documented deficiencies of our intuitive reasoning 
rather than complement and enhance it. Are we 
forced to choose between the unreliable and the 
inexplicable? Our approach to this dilemma is to 
explore whether in fact it may be possible to 
explicate probabilistic reasoning in ways better 
attuned to human thinking. 
Only recently has much attention begun to be paid 
to the automatic generation of comprehensible 
explanations for probabilistic and decision analytic 
schemes. Horvitz et a/. (1986) present a system 
which can explain its recommendations about 
what test to perform to gather diagnostic evidence. 
Langlotz et a/. (1986) present a scheme for 
quantitative analysis of decision trees, which 
explains qualitatively how one decision may 
outweigh another in terms of expected utility. 
Klein (1990) presents a scheme for qualitatively 
explaining the implications of hierarchical additive 
value functions. Elsaesser (1988) provides some 
empirical evidence on the efficacy of explanations 
of simple Bayesian inference, with one variable 
and one observation. Strat's (1988) system 
explains the dynamics of Dempster-Shafer 
reasoning based on sensitivity analysis, with 
interesting implications for probabilistic schemes. 
Sember and Zukerman's (1989) scheme 
generates micro explanations, that is local 
propagation of evidence between neighbouring 
variables in a belief net. 
Our focus here is on approaches for generating 
macro explanations, intended to explain 
probabilistic reasoning over larger networks. We 
wish to avoid dogmatism about what kinds of 
explanation scheme will be most effective, but 
rather explore a variety of approaches, including 
graphical, numerical, and linguistic 
representations. We are interested in both 
quantitative and qualitative forms of explanation in 
various combinations. This paper gives an 
account of several of the key ideas that have 
emerged from our initial work. 
Since our goal is to produce interpretations of 
probabilistic reasoning that are more compatible 
with human reasoning styles, we started out with 
an empirical study of human strategies for 
uncertain reasoning. This provided us with the 
inspiration for the design of two new and 
contrasting modes of explaining probabilistic 
reasoning, namely qualitative belief propagation 
and scenario-based reasoning. 
It is useful to distinguish explanation as the 
communication of static knowledge or beliefs from 
explanation of the dynamics, of how beliefs are 
changed in the light of new evidence. Explanation 
of the statics, though relatively straightforward, is a 
prerequisite for explanation of the dynamics. 
Among the issues in static explanation we discuss 
are the use of belief nets, the use of linguistic 
phrases to express probabilities, and the 
importance of causal knowledge. Next we outline 
the use of qualitative belief propagation as a 
means of dynamic explanation. This includes an 
analysis of qualitative intercausal reasoning, 
generalizing Pearl's notion of "explaining away", 
with a theorem giving a precise characterization of 
when it applies. Finally, we describe a scenario­
based approach to explanation. This is illustrated 
by explanations generated from our prototype 
implementation in Allegro Common Lisp, QIQ 
(Qualitative Interface to the Quantitative). 
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2 Human reasoning under uncertainty 
The essence of effective explanation is to design 
its content and form to mesh with the knowledge 
and modes of thought of the person to whom you 
are explaining. Thus, producing good 
explanations of formal reasoning under uncertainty 
requires an understanding of the way people 
reason intuitively under uncertainty. There is a 
vast literature on human judgment under 
uncertainty for very simple inference problems, 
typically with a single hypothesis variable and a 
single observation (e.g. see Kahneman et al., 
1982 and Morgan & Henrion, 1990 for reviews), 
but relatively little is known about cognitive 
processes in more complex situations. To improve 
our insights into this and to seek inspiration for 
alternative approaches to explanation, we 
conducted a series of cognitive process-tracing 
studies. We recorded and analyzed verbal 
protocols from subjects asked to think aloud as 
they performed uncertain reasoning tasks 
(Druzdzel, 1989). Here is a sample task: 
Harry is in the house of a new acquaintance and 
suddenly finds himself sneezing. This could be 
due to an incipient cold, or to an allergy attack 
brought on by a cat. Before he started sneezing 
he would have judged the cold and allergy both 
about equally unlikely. 
(a) Given he is sneezing, roughly what is the 
probability Harry is getting a cold? 
(b) Suppose Harry now notices small paw-prints 
on the furniture. How should this affect his 
degree of belief that he is getting a cold? 
(c) Suppose he then hears a barking of a small 
dog in the room next-door. How does this 
further affect his degree of belief that he is 
getting a cold? 
Most subjects were able to provide qualitative 
answers to these questions rather easily. In (a) 
they judged a cold was about as likely as not. In 
(b) that the paw-prints should decrease his belief 
in the cold, since the sneezing might be explained 
by a cat, suggested by the paw-prints. And in (c), 
that hearing the barking dog should increase belief 
in the cold again, since the dog provides an 
alternative explanation of the paw prints. 
One unsurprising finding was that subjects 
generally used qualitative terms for probabilities, 
using quantitative terms almost not at all. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies of 
intuitive reasoning (e.g. Kuipers, Moskovitz & 
Kassirer, 1988}. Another finding confirming 
previous work (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1980) 
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was the importance of causal reasoning in 
uncertain inference. 
Less expected and of considerable interest in the 
current context, was evidence of two quite 
different strategies for plausible reasoning. One, 
which we call qualitative belief propagation, 
involves propagating the qualitative impact of 
evidence from event to event, following local 
causal and diagnostic relationships. For example, 
barking indicates the presence of the dog. The 
dog explains the pawmarks, which are th�n . weaker evidence for the cat. Reduced belief 1n the 
cat in turn reduces belief in the allergy. This is 
noJ.. less of an explanation for the sneezing and so 
requires an increased belief in the cold. 
The other strategy, scenario-based reasoning, is 
quite different, and was more common in the 
protocols. The reasoner identifies one or more 
scenarios, that is consistent instantiations of the 
variables, forming a coherent, often causal,-story, 
compatible with the known evidence. For 
example, Harry has a cold, which explains the 
sneezing; there is no cat, and so no allergy; the 
dog explains the paw-prints and barking. Subjects 
often appeared to develop one or more such 
quasi-deterministic scenarios. Figure 1 shows two 
such scenarios, as a subset of the event tree. 
They are suggestiv� of tw<;> quite di!ferent . explanation strateg1es, wh1ch we w111 descnbe 
below. 
3. Explanation of static probabilistic 
knowledge 
3.1 Belief nets 
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By now the most familiar display of qualitative 
probabilistic information is the Bayesian belief net 
(and influence diagram), which pr�vi�es a . perspicuous display of purely quaht�t1ve beliefs 
about conditional dependence and Independence. 
Figure 2 provides a belief network for probabilistic 
knowledge for the "sneeze" example. 
The nodes depict the key variables. (NB, we use 
the abbreviated term "Cat" to mean "the presence 
of a cat in the vicinity", and so on.) As usual, the 
directed arcs depict dependences between them, 
(or more strictly the absence of arcs depicts 
independence). The same. information could, of 
course, be represented in text as a list of the 
dependencies, such as, 
The probability of sneezing is 
affected by cold. 
The probability of sneezing depends 
on allergy. 
l----< �;...;;..:o:. __ and so on. 
Figure 1: Two scenarios for the 
sneeze problem 
The probability of some target event (e.g. the cold) 
can then be judged by the relative probability of 
the scenario(s) that contain(s) it. If one considered 
all possible scenarios, then this strategy is an 
exact algorithm for Bayesian reasoning. This is 
generally too much mental effort, but it can be a 
good approximation if one considers only the few 
most probable scenarios. On the other hand, if a 
likely scenario is ignored or its relativ� probab�lity 
misestimated, it can lead to severe b1ases. Th1s 
scenario-based reasoning appears related to 
explanation-based reasoning identified by a 
number of psychologists as strategies for complex 
reasoning tasks (e.g. Pennington & Hastie, 1988). 
Both qualitative belief propagation and s�en�rio­
based reasoning can be seen as approx1mat1ons 
of exact algorithms for probabilistic inference. 
Figure 2: A belief network for the 
"sneeze example" 
The improved perspicuity of the graphical 
representation in showing the locality of 
relationships is immediately clear. Although for 
some purposes the textual form is valuable, 
particularly for those not familiar with the belief 
network notation. To complete the static 
explanation we need to add the probabilities in 
some form. 
3.2 Linguistic probabilities 
One appealing approach to render numerical 
probabilities more digestible is to translate them 
Into verbal phrases, such as "very likely" or 
"somewhat improbable". A considerable empirical 
literature reports people's interpretations of verbal 
probability phrases in terms of numerical 
probabilities or ranges. In general this research 
has found a degree of consistency in usage, at 
least in the ordering people assign to sets of such 
phrases (Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Wallsten et 
a/, 1986; Kong et a/. 1986). But it has also found 
significant variability in interpretation between 
people, and considerable context dependence 
(Brun & Teigen, 1988). Nuclear safety engineers 
mean something quite different by "uncommon" 
than physicians. People interpret other people's 
use of phrases somewhat differently (and with 
wider range of uncertainty) from what they 
themselves claim to mean by the phrases 
(Wallsten et al; 1986); that is, they are sensitive to 
the variability among people. This suggests 
mappings from phrases to numbers, needed for 
encoding, should be somewhat different, with 
broader ranges than mappings from phrases to 
numbers, as used here for explanations. 
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even by event within a network. For example, 
"unlikely" may mean something quite different 
when applied to the chance of allergy to an 
antibiotic than the chance of dying in an operation. 
If desired, a different mapping may be used for 
each event and influence. However we expect a 
small number of mappings will be sufficient to 
cover the contexts for a given network. 
Relevant phrases can be divided into belief 
phrases, such as "very probable" or "unlikely", and 
frequency phrases, such as "common" or "rare". 
Most come in both adjectival form, as above, and 
adverbial form, such as "probably" or "commonly". 
We have found it most natural to express marginal 
prior and posterior probabilities of events in terms 
of adjectival probabilities, for example, 
Cold is very unlikely (p=0.08) 
Cat is unlikely (p=O.l) 
Dog is unlikely (p=O.l) 
and to express conditional probabilities or causal 
strengths (see below) in terms of adverbial 
frequencies: 
Cat commonly (p=0 . 8) causes allergy. 
Dog as often as not (p=O.S) causes 
barking. 
The above examples are generated by 010 as 
Probability part of the static explanation of the sneeze belief 
Adjectives Adverbs network. 
o-..-.-- impossible never Due to variations between people and contexts, 
very unlikely very rarely some vagueness in interpretation inevitably 
..--- unlikely rarely remains. To some this is part of the attraction of verbal phrases over numerical probabilities. 
1.--- fairly unlikely fairly rarely Others may wish to see the numerical probability 
less likely than not less often than notin addition to the verbal phrase, as in the 
-1(11..--- as likely as not as often as not examples above. This allows users to pay 
more likely than not more often than n"'��ention t� whatever they find most helpful •. and, '\Vith expenence, perhaps to learn the mapp1ngs. 
,__ _ fairly likely fairly often 
____ likely commonly While most prev!�l;JS empirical work has examined 
. absolute probabJhtJes, one recent study (Eisaesser very likely very commonly & Henrion, 1990) has examined mappings from 
1.fl-IMK.-- certain always relative probabilities or changes in probabilities to 
Figure 3: Sample mappings from numerical 
probabilities to adjective and adverb phrases. 
To cope with differences in personal preference 
and the context-dependence of interpretations, our 
explanation system, 010, provides a variety of 
mappings, including two mappings from the 
literature (Wallsten et al. 1986; Kong et a/. 1986), 
and our own synthesis from the literature, 
illustrated in figure 3. We have tried to use terms 
which minimize ambiguity and variability among 
people and contexts. Users can select from these 
mappings or provide their own. The context and 
interpretation may vary not only by domain, but 
phrases such as "more likely than". They found 
that a fixed mapping to phrases from differences in 
probabilities provided a better model than ratios of 
probabilities or odds. These phrases are useful for 
comparing the probabilities of events or updates in 
degrees of belief, such as: 
Cold is slightly less likely than 
cat (0. 08/0. 10) . 
No cat is a great deal more likely 
than cat (0. 1/0. 9) . 
3.3 Causal relationships 
A key finding of the behavioral decision theory 
literature Is the psychological importance of causal 
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structure in uncertain reasoning (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1980). People find it easier to reason 
from cause to effect than vice versa. As we 
mentioned, this was also apparent in our protocol 
studies. Some, notably Pearl (1988), have 
explicitly identified the directed arcs of belief nets 
with cause-effect relations. Others have argued 
that there is no inherent relationship with causality: 
After all, the arcs can be reversed simply by 
application of Bayes' rule, but causality cannot. But 
in any case, it is usually most natural to assess 
influences in causal direction. We view knowledge 
of causal relations as an important semantic 
enrichment to the pure belief net. It is not 
essential for Bayesian inference, but can be of 
great help in communicating with people, both for 
encoding expert opinion and for explanation. 
QIQ can encode a cause-effect relationship as 
supplementary knowledge about each influence 
arc. This information is used in generating text 
descriptions of influences, for example: 
Cat commonly (p=0. 8) causes allergy. 
Cat is the only cause of allergy. 
The quantities described here are causal 
strengths, that is the probability that the specified 
precursor event, if present, is sufficient to cause 
the successor. If no other cause of the successor 
is present then the causal strength is the same as 
the conditional probability of the effect given the 
cause. This is the case with the link from cat to 
allergy, where no other cause is known (in this 
example). However, if other causes are possible, 
then the causal strengths may be different from 
the conditional probabilities. Causal strengths are 
an equivalent representation to the conditional 
probability representation, and each can be 
derived from the other. 
The best known application of causal strengths is 
in the noisy-OR gate, which often arises in 
situations with multiple alternative causes of a 
common effect. Each link from cause to effect is 
characterized by its causal strength, the probability 
of the effect given only that cause is present. The 
condition it embodies is sometimes called causal 
independence, namely that the probability that 
each present cause is sufficient to produce the 
effect is independent of the presence or sufficiency 
of other causes. For example, we have, 
Cold very commonly (p=0. 9) causes 
sneezing. 
Allergy very commonly (p=0. 9) causes 
sneezing. 
Causal independence can be expressed as: 
Cold does not affect the tendency of 
allergy to cause sneezing, and vice 
versa. 
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In this case we also assume no leaks (Henrion, 
1990), i.e. no "spontaneous" occurence of the 
effect in the absence of explicitly modelled causes: 
There is no other cause of sneezing 
than cold and allergy 
In other cases we cannot rule out leaks, for 
example: 
Cat as often as not (p=O.S) causes 
paw marks. 
Dog as often as not (p=O. S) causes 
paw marks. 
There are also other very unlikely 
(p=O.l) causes of paw marks. 
The latter assertion gives the leak probability, that 
is the probability of paw marks given no cat or dog. 
Note that the former two assertions do not give the 
simple conditional probability of paw marks given 
the cat (dog), but given also none of the "other 
causes" mentioned in the last assertion. 
The entire static description of the belief net used 
in these examples is completed by the following 
assertions: 
Dog as often as not (p=O. S) causes 
barking. 
Dog is the only cause of barking. 
4 Qualitative belief propagation 
The goal of qualitative belief propagation is to find 
the direction of the impact of an observed variable 
on the degree of belief in another variable, 
whether increased, decreased, or unchanged (+-
0). Wellman (1988) presents a scheme for 
qualitative probabilistic networks (QPNs) which 
provides an appealing formal basis for this task for 
arbitrary belief nets. Wellman's scheme uses an 
inference algorithm for QPNs using arc reversal 
and graph reduction, modelled on Shachter's 
algorithms for inference in quantitative belief 
networks. However, human qualitative belief 
propagation appears to trace the impact of 
evidence locally from node to node, which seems 
more reminiscent of the quantitative belief 
propagation or message-passing algorithms 
developed by Pearl and others than the reduction­
type algorithms. 
Wellman (1988) provides a persuasive argument 
for first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) as the 
best formal interpretation of the informal notion of 
the sign of an influence, whether knowledge of A 
being true (high) increases or decreases belief in 
B being true (high). Thus a positive influence of 
binary variable A on variable B is defined thus: 
I+(A, B)<=> P(b Ia y) 2: P( b I a y), 'Vy [1] 
(NB: We use the convention that uppercase letters 
denote variables, and lowercase their values: a 
means A is false.) Signs may be assigned to arcs 
in the network either by direct assessment or, for 
qualitative explanation of quantitative reasoning, 
as an abstraction from quantitative assessments. 
In the sneeze example, it is intuitively clear (and 
consistent with the numbers used in the example) 
that all influences are positive. For simplicity, we 
will assume the network is singly connected and 
limit ourselves to binary variables. 
4.1 Three types of Inference 
As a prerequisite to describing the algorithm for 
qualitative belief propagation, we must first 
distinguish the three types of inference: Predictive 
(or causa� inference is in the same direction as 
the original qualitative influence. Diagnostic 
inference is in the reverse direction. lntercausal 
inference gives the qualitative impact of evidence 
for one variable A on another variable B, when 
both have influences on a third variable C, about 
which we have independent evidence. These 
three situations are illustrated below in Figure 4. 
• --.... ,.�-.... 
Predictive Diagnostic lntercausal 
inference inference inference 
Figure 4: Three types of Inference. 
Qualitative predictive inference is quite simple. If 
we have positive evidence E that increases our 
belief in A, and the influence of A on B is positive, 
then E should also increase our belief in B 
(actually, not decrease it, given Wellman's weak 
definition of the direction of influence). More 
generally, concatenation (chaining) produces an 
influence whose sign is the product of the signs of 
its component influences. 
16(E, A) & 16(A, B) => ll>*l>(E, B) 
Diagnostic inference is similar to predictive 
inference, although a little more complicated since 
variable A inherits any relevant predecessors of B 
in inverting the direction of the arrow. If we want to 
propagate the effect of evidence across two 
divergent arrows, we can simply chain the 
diagnostic and predictive inference. Observation of 
pawmarks increase belief in the cat, which in turn 
increases belief in the allergy. 
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But propagating across convergent arrows is less 
straightforward: If there is no diagnostic evidence 
for the common effect (or direct observation), e.g. 
for C, then the two influencing variables A and B 
are of course independent, and so knowledge 
about A has no effect on B. On the other hand, if 
we observe C (or have diagnostic evidence for it) 
A and B become dependent. Thus, intercausal 
inference is not a simple concatenation of 
predictive and diagnostic inference. While there 
has been much informal discussion of "explaining 
away" (a form of intercausal reasoning) (Henrion, 
1986; Pearl, 1988), a precise characterization 
seems to be lacking of the general conditions 
under which explaining away or other qualitative 
intercausal reasoning applies. So we now turn to 
this issue. 
4.2 Qualitative lntercausal Influence 
"Explaining away" applies when A and B are two 
alternative causes of C, for example if the 
influence of A and B on C is a noisy OR. Given 
evidence for C, then evidence for A generally 
produces a reduced belief in B. But what if the 
influence is not a noisy-OR? What precisely are 
the conditions on the influence of A and B on C 
under which this qualitative pattern applies? Figure 
5 presents the question schematically. 
.. 
Observed 
Figure 5: Schematic of the operation of qualitative 
lntercausat reasoning 
•Theorem (qualitative lntercausal Influence): 
Suppose we have three logical variables, A, B. C. 
all with non-zero priors, where A and B can 
influence C, and A and B are marginally 
independent (there are no paths between A and B 
other than through C). Suppose C is observed to 
be true. Then a positive qualitative influence exists 
between A and B, i.e. 
P(b I a y) � P( b I a y), 'Vy [2] 
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��e the predecessors of B other than A, if 
P(c I a b x) P(c I a 6 X) 2: P(c I a 6 X) P(c I a b X), 
'Vx [3] 
where x are the predecessors of C other than A 
and B. The qualitative influence from A to B is 
zero or negative, i.e. we replace the 2: by= or::;;; in 
[1 ], if we replace the 2: in condition [3] by = or ::;;; 
respectively. • 
This result is easily derived from [2] by the 
application of Bayes' rule. Condition [3] is 
reminiscent of Wellman's (1988) definition of 
qualitative synergy, but instead of the multiplicative 
form he employs the additive form (for binary 
variables), 
P(c Ia b x)+P(c Ia 6 x) 2: P(c Ia 6 x) + P(c Ia b x), 
'Vx [4] 
It can be shown that if either or both of the 
influences from A to C and from B to C are 
positive, then multiplicative synergy [3] implies 
ad�itive synergy [4]. It is also easy to show that 
no1sy-OR gates are subsynergistic for product 
synergy, just as Wellman showed they are 
subsynergistic for additive synergy. Hence, if 
P(CjA,B) is a noisy OR gate and C is observed 
present, there is a negative influence between A 
and B. So any further evidence for B will decrease 
belief in A, and vice versa, since they provide 
alter�ative explan�t.ions for C. In other words [3] is prec1sely the cond1t1on under which explaining 
away applies. 
Note that if the influence has positive multiplicative 
synergy, A has a positive influence on B, the �nverse of. explaining away. For example, if the Influence 1s a "leaky noisy AND gate", in which C 
has an increased chance of occurring if A and B 
both occur, then given C, knowledge of A may 
increase belief in B. For example, suppose that 
the presence of flammable material and an ignition 
source together can cause combustion, which in 
turn may cause smoke (which also has other 
possible causes). Observation of smoke can 
create a positive influence from flammable 
material to the ignition source. 
4.3 An example of quaiHatlve propagation 
We illustrate how these ideas may be applied to 
provide qualitative explanation using the sneeze 
example, somewhat like that provided by some of 
our subjects. Consider question (c) from above, 
how does observation of barking affect our belief 
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in the cold, given we already have observed 
sneezing and pawmarks? Since both the cases of 
convergent influences (sneezing and paw marks) 
are noisy ORs with observed effects, explaining 
away applies, that is they can be reduced to 
negative influences between the causes. We can 
generate a trace of the explanation thus: 
Observe sneezing and paw-marks. 
Impact of barking on cold? 
1. Observation of barking is 
evidence for dog. 
2. Increased probability of dog 
helps explain paw marks, and so 
weakens evidence for cat. 
3. Reduced probability of cat 
reduces probability of allergy. 
4. Reduced probability of allergy 
reduces ability to explain sneezing, 
and so increases probability of 
cold. 
In summary, observation of barking 
increases probability of cold. 
This illustrates all three kinds of propagation. Step 
1 involves simple diagnostic inference over a 
positive influence. Step 2 involves intercausal 
inference, producing a negative influence from dog 
to cat. Step 3 involves simple predictive inference, 
propagating negative evidence over a positive 
influence. And step 4 involves intercausal 
inference, producing another negative influence 
from allergy to cold. Since there are two positive 
steps and two negative steps (the intercausal 
inferences), the chaining produces a cumulative 
positive influence between barking and cold as 
shown in Figure 6. We should point out that the 
scheme as described is limited to singly 
connected networks of binary variables. 
Figure 6: Propagation of qualitative 
probabilistic Inference. 
5 Scenario-based explanations 
Whereas inference schemes using propagation 
operate on a belief network representation of 
knowledge, scenario-based explanations are 
based on scenario trees (also known as probability 
trees, or decision trees without the decision 
variables). Each path from root to an end node 
represents a scenario, or sequence of events. 
The psychological literature suggests that it may 
be easier to understand scenarios if they are 
presented as coherent causal stories. So in an 
attempt to make scenarios easier to grasp, we can 
order the events in a scenario so that effects follow 
their causes, and employs causal conjunctions to 
link them when appropriate, for example: 
No cold; cat causes allergy, which 
causes sneezing. 
Dog causes barking and paw marks; no 
cat, hence no allergy; cold causes 
sneezing. 
In some scenarios, an event may deviate from 
what is expected, having a low probability given 
its predecessors. Even though a cat is present 
there may be no allergic reaction. In such cases, 
we can aid interpretation by indicating such 
surprises by an exception conjunction such as 
"but" for an event with low conditional probability: 
No cold; cat, but no allergy, hence 
no sneezing. 
The probability of each scenario is the product of 
the conditional probabilities of all the events in it. 
Exact Bayesian inference to find the posterior 
probability of an event can be performed by 
looking at the ratio of the sum of the probabilities 
of all scenarios compatible with the event to the 
sum of all those not compatible, after eliminating 
all scenarios not consistent with the observations. 
The number of possible scenarios is generally 
large of course, and cognitively unmanageable. 
But fortunately, it is often possible to understand 
the essentials of what is going on by examining 
only a few of the most probable scenarios. 
The following is a simple scenario-based 
explanation from the sneeze example. We ask it 
to explain the probability assigned to cold given 
sneezing has been observed: 
why cold 
Given: 
Sneezing must have been caused by 
cold or allergy. 
The following scenario(s) are 
compatible with cold: 
A. Cold and no cat hence no 
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allergy 0.47 
Other less probable 
scenario(s) 0. 06 
The following scenario(s) are 
incompatible with cold: 
B. No Cold and cat causing 
allergy 0. 48 
Scenario A is about as likely as 
scenario B (0. 47/0. 48) 
because cold in A is a great deal 
less likely than no cold in B 
(0. 08/0. 92) ' 
although no cat in A is a great deal 
more likely than cat in B (0. 9/0. 1) . 
Therefore cold is slightly more 
likely than not (p=0. 52) . 
QIQ first displays what is known and what can be 
definitely inferred from it. It then gives a list of one 
or more scenarios which are compatible with the 
target variable (cold) and a second list of 
scenarios which are incompatible with it. Since 
currently our only observation is sneezing, the 
variables paw marks, dog, and barking are 
irrelevant, and so the scenarios mention only cold, 
cat, and allergy. 
In general there may be a vast number of possible 
scenarios (exponential in the number of uncertain 
variables), so it only gives the most probable 
one(s) in each list. The rest are grouped as "other 
less probable scenario(s)", those which collectively 
contribute less than 15% of the overall probability 
for that list. This parameter can be varied to 
control the length and precision of the explanation. 
The next part of the explanation compares the 
probabilities of the most important pairs of 
scenarios in terms of significant differences in the 
probabilities of their component events. Any 
contrasts that are significant (probabilities differing 
by a factor of more than 1 .2 in the default option) 
are mentioned in explaining the relative 
probabilities. The explanation lists, after 
"because", the contrasts favoring the more 
probable s�enario, and then, after "although", the 
contrasts, if any, supporting the other scenario. 
This scheme is based on the principle that it is 
easier to judge the relative probability of two 
scenarios by comparing their differences than by 
judging their absolute probabilities. The 
co'!lparisons use the relative probability phrases 
calibrated against numerical probability differences 
by Elsaesser & Henrion (1990). In this case the 
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relatively low probability of cold in scenario A is 
just about balanced by the low probability of cat in 
scenario B. Another possible scenario which has 
both cold and cat (hence allergy) is not even 
mentioned, because having two very unlikely 
events its relative probability is negligible relative 
to the two scenarios each with a single unlikely 
event. So, it is contained in the "other less 
probable scenario(s)" group. 
A second example explanation assumes that paw 
marks and barking as well as sneezing have been 
observed: 
why cold 
Given: 
Sneezing must have been caused by 
cold or allergy. 
Paw Marks could have been caused by 
cat or dog or another unknown cause. 
Barking must have been caused by 
dog. 
The following scenario(s) are 
compatible with cold: 
A. Cold and no cat hence no 
allergy and dog 0. 38 
B. Cold and cat causing allergy 
and dog 0. 05 
Other less probable scenario(s) 0.01 
Total probability of cold 0. 44 
The following scenario(s) are 
incompatible with cold: 
C. No Cold and cat causing 
allergy and dog 0. 56 
Scenario A is much more likely than 
scenario B (0. 38/0. 05) 
because no cat in A is a great deal 
more likely than cat in B 
(0.90/0. 10) . 
Scenario A is somewhat less likely 
than scenario C (0. 38/0. 56) 
because cold in A is a great deal 
less likely than no cold in C 
(0. 08/0.92) 1 
although no cat in A is a great deal 
more likely than cat in C 
(0. 90/0. 10) . 
Therefore cold is fairly unlikely 
(p=0. 44) . 
Note that several techniques are provided to 
abstract and simplify the explanation. First, only 
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relevant events are considered, that is events 
whose consideration affects the target probability 
given available observations. Second, only those 
scenarios that contribute more than 1 0% of the 
probability to the target event (or its complement) 
are listed explicitly. This can·drastically simplify the 
explanation, since many real cases seem to be 
like the example above, where a few (two to four) 
scenarios turn out to have the bulk of the 
probability, and the vast mass can be ignored 
without significant error. Thirdly, in comparisons of 
the relative probability of pairs of scenarios, only 
those events with substantially different 
probabilities are mentioned. 
Additional abstraction techniques could provide 
further simplification. Some linked variables might 
be combined so that they can be treated as one. 
For example, allergy might be combined into cat, 
considering cat to cause sneezing directly. This 
reduction of variables can reduce the number of 
distinct scenarios and also the complexity of each 
scenario. Another improvement in a decision 
context would be to consider the importance of a 
scenario in terms of expected utility rather than 
simply probability. In a medical context, low 
probability scenarios leading to death may have a 
stronger claim to be listed explicitly than higher 
probability scenarios with less interesting 
consequences. 
There is considerable psychological evidence for 
the prevalence of scenario-based reasoning in 
human thinking, and of the importance of 
coherent, causal stories (e.g. Pennington & Hastie, 
1988). The psychological literature has focussed 
generally on the ways in which this leads to 
systematic distortions and biases in probabilistic 
judgment. Our approach here is to generate 
explanations matched to human preferences for 
explanatory stories, but to select and present the 
scenarios in such a way that they provide a 
reasonable guide to the relative probabilities of 
interest. 
6 Conclusions 
We have outlined a variety of approaches to 
explaining probabilistic knowledge, including 
combinations of graphic, textual, and numeric 
information, and two new schemes for explaining 
probabilistic reasoning. Any specific explanation 
will be too verbose for some, too brief for others, 
and simply confusing for yet others. The art in 
designing a good explanation is to match the style 
and focus to the skills and interests of the person 
to whom you are explaining. Users are generally 
the best judge of their preferences and interests, 
and so it is important to provide them with levers to 
control the style and completeness, such as the 
probability cut-off parameters mentioned in 
scenario generation. Providing both phrases and 
numbers should please most people, and may 
even give numerophobes the opportunity to 
become familiar with the relationships. 
Qualitative belief propagation and scenario-based 
explanations will be appealing in different 
situations. Pro_Q�tion seems to wort<weJI in 
cases with smgly __ c()nne]ted:neiworks and. strQ.ng 
·q"Lia!irative influe11ces� .:T:he analysis of qualitative 
intercal.Jsal·reasoning we have presented provides 
a principled basis for understanding some 
important patterns of intuitive reasoning, as well as 
extending formal methods for qualitative 
probabilistic reasoning. While belief propagation 
provides intuition into the direction of the impacts 
of evidence, in its purely qualitative form it 
provides little guidance about the magnitude of 
effects or probabilities. Sc�nario-based 
explanations can work with muitlpfy connected 
networf<�:Scenario�based reasoning also appears 
to offer a natural way of reconciling probabilistic 
reasoning to possible-worlds logic-based 
approaches to reasoning. Both schemes lend 
themselves to convenient abstraction and 
simplification, which are essential in generating 
comprehensible explanations. 
This paper summarizes work from an initial 
exploratory phase of our research program into 
explaining probabilistic reasoning. There is 
considerable scope for developing and refining of 
these techniques. Initial experimental evaluation 
suggests the value of such explanations in 
improved user insight (Druzdzel, 1990). But a 
more definitive understanding of the merits of such 
schemes must await more extended empirical 
comparisons of their effectiveness under a variety 
of conditions. 
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